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What is the relationship between the term ‘ADHD’, and 
the object it purports to represent? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the question: what is the relationship between the term ADHD, and the 
object it purports to represent?  While the most familiar linguistic position—Referential Theory— 
suggests that the term constitute an etymological peg corresponding to a particular part of nature, 
there are other, arguably more sophisticated, philosophical approaches that point to an altogether 
more complex relationship.  These approaches do not assume that ‘behaviour disorders’, such as 
ADHD, are objective facts of nature, facts to which words can simply be adhered.  Using the work 
of Wittgenstein, the intention here is to use the philosophy of language to destabilise, not just the 
relationship between the term ADHD and the idea to which it applies, but also the coherence of 
the notion of ADHD itself.      
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 Introduction 
 
 
Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a relatively recent psychological and social 
phenomenon.  It only appeared as a fully fledged, formalised disorder in Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM-III) of the American Psychiatric Association in 1987.  Before that, there simply 
existed a loose, relatively unconnected cluster of behaviours and observations, mostly concerning 
the conduct of young boys.  However, from 1987 onwards, the popularity of the diagnosis has 
spread exponentially; with its symptoms of fidgeting, excitability, impulsivity, and lack of self-
control, ADHD has become the explanation of choice for those seeking a ready and unequivocal 
reason for domestic and classroom misbehaviour among children.  The section of the schooling 
population has grown from zero, to its current rate of 11% in the United States (Visser et al., 
2014), and 5.3% worldwide (Polanczyk et al., 2007).  Likewise, the sale of stimulants used to treat 
the symptoms of this new disorder has also grown exponentially, with sales increasing ninefold 
between 1993 and 2003 alone, representing a 3 billion dollar industry (Scheffler et al., 2007).  
Importantly, ADHD does not stand alone as a diagnosis relating to aberrant student behaviour.  It 
takes its place as one of hundreds of disorders that can now be applied to the conduct of children, 
and which are generally dealt with through medication.  This pathologisation of conduct covers 
the full spectrum of human idiosyncrasy, from shyness (Elective Mutism) and anger (Intermittent 
Explosive Disorder), to social clumsiness (Borderline Personality Disorder) and over-exuberance 
(Histrionic Personality Disorder).  All of these diverse categories play their part, alongside 
ADHD, in the ever-increasing medicalisation of human difference.     
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, this relatively recent wave of new disorders was swiftly followed by an 
incoming tide of controversy—particular regarding ADHD—controversies which are still a long 
way from being settled.  These debates begin with whether such behaviour disorders genuinely 
exist in the first place, and then continue with who is actually in a position to make a valid 
diagnosis, and how does that differ from simply labelling, who benefits most from that 
diagnosis/labelling, are pharmacological methods the best way of dealing with the issue, what are 
the consequences of such interventions, are those deemed to have such behaviour disorders 
responsible for their conduct—the list goes on.  The debate about whether or not behaviour 
disorders like ADHD actually exist is probably the most important, since the rest become moot if 
the answer to this question is in the negative.  There are a number of positions that have been 
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adopted by the various sides of this argument—specifically relating to ADHD—of which three are 
probably worth noting here: 
 
The first is comprised of those who accept the notion of ADHD as a newly discovered fact about 
the natural world.  This epistemological position understands the disorder as an objective truth, an 
aberration of the human mind revealed by the keen eye of modern science, and while there may be 
some in this category who think that there may exist a degree of recent over-diagnosis of the 
condition, this does not affect the underlying veracity of the condition itself.  It is these 
assumptions that currently constitute the dominant position of the medical and psychological 
sciences.         
 
The second position regards ADHD as a either a fraud or a mistake.  It has been created as a 
convenient mechanism for selling a particular product (Conrad & Potter, 2000; Baughman, 2006), 
for better enabling the enforcement of strict disciplinary codes in our schools (Phillips, 2006; 
Rosenthal, 2010), and as a medium through which the discipline of psychology can expand its 
professional and conceptual boundaries (Cohen, 2006).  An underlying assumption here is that 
since behaviour disorders like ADHD are based upon nothing at all, eventually their non-existence 
will be revealed, and they will immediately -disappear.  
 
The third position is that they are the product of the rise of differentiating forms of government.  
That is, by sub-dividing the population into ever-increasing numbers of categories, each of which 
can regulated differently, it becomes possible normalise citizens more and more effectively.  This 
normalisation does not just include the most obvious external manifestations of docility and 
discipline (Foucault, 1977), but with the rise of the psy-disciplines, also the smallest workings of 
the human mind (Rose, 1990).  ADHD is therefore best understood as one of a large number of 
categories of childhood difference, each with its own set of specific characteristics, forms of 
intervention, and prognosis, categories largely shaped within the disciplinary environments such 
as the contemporary school (Tait, 2001; Graham, 2008).     
 
Given these three different positions, the question therefore arises: when the term ADHD is used, 
just what exactly is it referring to?  Currently, there appear to be little agreement on this issue.  
Clearly, the second position above would answer that question with: ‘nothing at all’.  However, 
 the other two positions—the dominant medical/psychological model, and the alternative 
governmental approach—would mostly likely answer the question differently.  This paper will 
seek to address the fundamental underlying question: what is the relationship between the term 
‘ADHD’, and the object it purports to represent?  It will be attempt to answer this question 
through the deployment of various arguments from within the philosophy of language. 
 
‘Diagnosing’ vs. ‘Labelling’ ADHD 
 
In the article Doctors diagnose, teachers label, McMahan (2012) discusses pre-service teachers’ 
beliefs about, and attitudes towards, various discourses surrounding ADHD.  The most interesting 
finding of McMahon’s study involves the notion of ‘labelling’ children with ADHD, in that 
labelling is something that teachers do, both before any kind of medical/psychological 
examination (ie. attaching the term to difficult students), as well as after official diagnosis 
(allowing this diagnosis to then colour perceptions of the child).  This kind of labelling is seen as 
totally different from a ‘legitimate’ doctor’s diagnosis of ADHD, which is positioned as the 
objective discovery of an existing natural condition, by someone who is trained to make that 
discovery.  ADHD is thus understood as a biological fact.  That is, while a ‘diagnosis’ of ADHD 
is formal, valid and objective, ‘labelling’ someone with ADHD is both derogatory and 
discriminatory.  As McMahon (20102, 261) states:         
 
The pre-service teachers’ understanding that labelling occurs before and/or after, or 
more precisely as distinct from, diagnosis leaves a neutral space in which diagnosis, 
itself, rests uncontested.  I contend that this lack of debate or questioning surrounding 
the actual diagnosis of ADHD represents an acceptance of truth about ADHD.  It is 
suggestive of an unquestionable, scientific authority of the diagnosis and the 
diagnostician. 
  
In philosophical terms, two observations can be made here.  The first is that the students’ 
understandings of diagnosis vs. labelling reflect a Realist understanding of truth.  That is, within 
this context, doctors and psychologists have access to the truth of how the world actually is—
presumably in contrast to mere teachers, and their labelling.  The truth of ADHD is there to be 
found within the natural world, for anyone with the scientific credentials to uncover it.  Scientists 
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themselves play no part in the construction of that truth; they are simply the medium through 
which it passes. 
 
The second observation is that the term ADHD unproblematically corresponds to an existing fact 
of nature.  ‘ADHD’ is seen as a relatively unproblematic signifier, an etymological peg that 
corresponds to a tangible psychological entity, a simple linguistic description of generalised type, 
or ‘kind’, which has an essence entirely separate from human value-analysis.  The notion that 
linguistic expressions are like labels, denoting items in the real world, is normally called 
Referential Theory (Lycan, 2000).  This theory has its conceptual origins in the work of John 
Stuart Mill (1843), who traced the meanings of words to the objects to which they referred, 
arguing that a word denotes a thing by standing for it, just as a proper name is deemed to stand for 
a particular person.   
 
So, to answer the question set out in the title of this paper specifically using Referential Theory: 
the acronym ADHD is deemed to stand for a particular natural entity; this term ‘hooks on’ to the 
objective world by means of direct reference to it.  That is, there exists an objective, tangible 
biological category—independent of human analysis and intentionality—and the term ADHD 
stands for this entity.     
 
This understanding of language sounds simple enough, and relative incontrovertible.  However, 
towards the end of the 19th century, this model of language started to unravel, when philosophy 
was deemed to take a ‘linguistic turn’ (Bergmann, 1964; Rorty, 1967).  Leading the philosophical 
charge were the Logical Positivists, based upon the initial ideas of  Gottlob Frege (1892), closely 
followed by Bertrand Russell (1905), who regarded this understanding of reference as 
unsatisfactory, and set about describing a far more complex picture altogether.  The primary thrust 
of these criticisms can best be articulated within two sets of examples, in that Frege set out some 
concerns based around the problem of apparent reference to non-existents, as well as the problem 
of negative existentials.  The former notes that a sentence such as ‘the boy has a unicorn’ runs into 
difficulty within Mill’s version of Referential Theory, since, the non-existence of unicorns 
problematises any theory of meaning based upon a simple relationship between word and 
referent—a concern that could arguably also be raised about the sentence ‘the boy has ADHD’.  
With regards to the problem of negative existentials, the sentence ‘Unicorns do not exist’ raises an 
 associated set of logical problems.  This sentence appears to be true, but if it is true, it cannot be 
about a unicorn, as they do not exist. However, if it is about a unicorn, then it is false, since 
unicorns must exist—and once again, the same argument could be run for the sentence ‘ADHD 
does not exist’. To put it another way, Frege’s conundrum means that accepting Referential 
Theory at face value suggests it may be difficult to deny the existence of anything at all, as long as 
it is thinkable.   
 
The central point being made by the Logical Positivists is that the link between words and the 
things in the world to which they refer, is far more complex than might initially be thought. In 
spite of this, most commentators would suggest that these observations simply lead to a more 
mediated version of Referential Theory, rather than its total rejection.  Accordingly, the answer to 
the question, ‘what is the relationship between the word disorder and the object it purports to 
represent?’ is still one of reference; ultimately, it still speaks of a singular, bounded term that can 
be applied to a discreet natural essence.  Logical Positivism remained part of a fundamentally 
realist conceptual framework, one that understood the central task of philosophy as organising an 
approach to language that removes confusion and illogic, and allows science to get on and do its 
work. 
 
In spite of these deeply entrenched philosophical problems, the main difficulty with the issue of 
mental disorders, such as ADHD, is that they cannot really be understood, in practice, as a neutral 
entity, utterly independent of human assessment, or social context, and as such, simple Referential 
Theory utterly fails to convince.  After all, in a culture without written language, the notion of 
‘Dyslexia’ has no purchase as a mental disorder; it is, in large part, its social, cultural, and 
educational context that affords it its status as pathology.  One of the most influential approaches 
to this issue can be seen in in Wakefield’s (1992) Harmful Dysfunction model of mental disorders.  
By addressing this theory, and several of the rebuttals that followed, it is possible to stake out 
some of the more important components of the debates over the philosophy of language.  It is also 
possible to draw some more informed conclusions about how the various shifts in these debates 
recalibrate the boundaries of what can be meant when the term ‘ADHD’ is used.   
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‘Harmful Dysfunction’ Theory and ADHD 
 
According to Wakefield (1992, 373), the notion of disorder, ‘… lies on the boundary between 
the given natural world and the constructed social world; a disorder exists when the failure of a 
person’s internal mechanisms to perform their functions as designed by nature impinges 
harmfully on the person’s wellbeing as defined by social values and meanings’.  As discussed in 
the introduction, the touchstone for disorders such as ADHD is generally regarded as the 
‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’(2013), now in its 5th edition (DSM-V).  
Running in parallel with this manual is the ‘International Classification of Diseases’ (1994), 
which also sets out various taxonomies of illness, disease and disorder.  Although very similar in 
many ways, one notable difference between these two foundational texts is their approach to 
defining disorder.  The ICD-10 does not have a formal definition; it merely includes a general 
covering statement, noting that disorder is not an exact term, but rather is one that implies, ‘the 
existence of a clinically recognisable set of symptoms or behaviour associated in most cases with 
distress and with interference with personal function’ (1994, 5).  In contrast, the DSM does 
incorporate a formal definition, although this was not regarded as necessary until the 3rd edition, 
published in 1980.  With the publication of the DSM-IV, the definition still remained vague, and 
according to even its author, fairly unsatisfactory (Spitzer, 1999): 
 
Each of the mental disorders is conceptualised as a clinically significant behavioural 
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is 
associated with present distress … Whatever its original cause, it must currently be 
considered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological or biological dysfunction 
in the individual. (DSM-IV, 1994, xxi-xxii) 
 
It was widely noted that this definition contained important unexplained elements, such as 
‘clinically significant syndrome’ and ‘dysfunction in the individual’ (Bolton, 2001).  As a 
consequence, the definition has often been considered operationally untenable (Boysen, 2007).  
Spitzer, the psychiatrist responsible for the DSM-IV definition, repeatedly stated that he had not 
succeeded in capturing the core of the ‘disorder’ problem (1999:431).   He went on to claim that 
this lacuna had now been filled by the work of Wakefield, and a definition shaped in the light of 
 this work needed to be adopted by the DSM-V, which was finally published with an additional 
sentence in the definition: ‘Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or 
disability in social, occupational or other important activities’ (2013, 20). The question then is: 
what is so special about Wakefield’s understanding of the term ‘disorder’? 
An Outline of Wakefield’s Position   
In 1992, Wakefield set out a new position on disorders, one based around twofold approach to 
the problem.  In this position, he posits a disorder as a hybrid concept, comprised of two 
separate, but inter-related elements.  The first is a factual component.  This is the supposition 
that there is a failure in the organism to fulfil its natural function, which he later defined as, ‘an 
effect of the organ or mechanism that enters into an explanation of the existence, structure, or 
activity of the organ or mechanism’ (Wakefield, 2007; 152).  He cites the example of the ability 
of the human perceptual apparatus to convey reasonable approximations of the immediate 
environment, and hence that the existence of gross hallucinations indicate a dysfunction.  
Wakefield bases this realist approach to difference upon arguments about natural selection.  He 
suggests that evolutionary explanations underpin what should be counted as a dysfunction, 
ultimately arguing that such dysfunctions are determined by an assessment of their likelihood of 
affecting reproductive success.  This, he considers, is a purely factual scientific appraisal—a 
truth of nature. 
 
The second element involves the issue of values.  While Wakefield recognises the ontological 
and epistemological advantages of constructing disorder as a purely objective, scientific concept, 
he wisely realises that the mere existence of some form of dysfunction is not sufficient to 
legitimate the attribution of a disorder.  He states that the dysfunction must also result in 
significant harm under existing environmental circumstances and cultural standards.  Therefore, 
while the failure of a naturally selected property is a necessary condition of a disorder, that 
failure is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a disorder.  Wakefield uses Albinism, 
which, though a function of a breakdown in the way skin pigmentation operates within an 
organism, does not cause harm, and is therefore not classified as a disorder.  In his analysis, 
Wakefield details the fluid nature of an assessment of harm.  He points to evolutionary 
conditions which may have lead to high levels of male aggression, levels which might 
legitimately be seen as part of the natural functioning of the male organism.  He goes on to 
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suggest that the loss of this high level of aggression—once a harmful dysfunction, and hence a 
disorder—could now be seen as an advantage within contemporary cultural circumstances.  
Therefore, this would probably preclude such a loss as constituting a disorder. 
  
Wakefield’s analysis has proven to be both popular and influential, in that it incorporates the 
claims of both camps within debates over disorder, ie. those who regard the term as simply 
representing an external, objective fact of nature, and those who regard the term as social in 
origin, a function of cultural and historical perspective.  A number of important commentators 
within the psychiatric community have concluded that Wakefield’s model offers the most 
productive framework for understanding and approaching the notion of disorder (see Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1999; Klein, 1999).  Even so, Wakefield’s work has not been without its critics, who 
largely fall into one of two categories.  The first still largely accepts the (possibility of the) 
validity of the objective component of the analysis, whereas the second calls this into question, 
and suggests instead a far more linguistically nebulous approach to the phenomenon of disorders.  
Taking these in turn: 
 
Problems with ‘Harmful Dysfunction’ – from the inside 
While these criticisms chip away at the objective component of Wakefield’s model, none seek to 
leave the basic terrain of a Referential Theory of language, wherein the term ‘disorder’ has some 
kind of matching essence in nature to which the term corresponds.  McNally (2000) expresses 
some concern over the viability of its dysfunction component.  He suggests that, within a hybrid 
model, the notion of dysfunction is itself a hybrid, and rather than this simply being a 
straightforward factual account of a natural biological function, it is actually comprised of a 
factual assertion about the operation of the mechanism, as well as a normative assessment that 
this mechanism is malfunctioning.  This viewpoint is also held by Fulford (1999), who argues 
that it is impossible to talk about the ‘failure’ of a mechanism produced via the processes of 
natural selection, without an understanding that this is both teleological and values-based.   
  
Kendell (2002) extends this criticism with the observation that the relationship between natural 
selection and the evolution of the higher cerebral function, whose failure is deemed to constitute 
a mental disorder, is too complex and mysterious a process to be simply read-off in such a 
reductionist manner.  He states that, given our current limited understanding of the cerebral 
 mechanisms underlying our most basic psychological functions, in most cases, all that can be 
done is to ‘infer the probable presence of a biological dysfunction’ (Kendell, 2002:112).  He also 
notes that reading and calculating—two capacities that a wide range of school-based disorders 
have been organised around—have been acquired by humans far too recently to be plausibly 
located within the logic of ‘natural functions designed by evolution’.  
 
Problems with ‘Harmful Dysfunction’ - From the Outside 
Rather than centring its concerns upon the question of precisely how the notion of disorder 
should have its boundaries organised, these criticisms seeks to problematise the existence of 
those boundaries altogether.  That is, a disorder is not positioned as a singular, monolithic 
concept, merely in need of a decent definition, rather a disorder is understood as an 
approximation, a cluster of loosely related ideas, without a clearly defined essence, or inherent 
meaning.  A number of writers adopt this position, but two articles are worthy of particular note. 
  
Kirkmayer and Young (1999) begin by raising a number of concerns over Wakefield’s model, 
contending that his concept of mental disorder fails at a practical level, since it neither 
corresponds to how the term is used in clinicians’ everyday practice, nor does it cover the ground 
needed to in order to be useful for research, or for clinical or social purposes.  They contend that 
the issue should not revolve around the formal linguistic properties of statements employing the 
term disorder, but should revolve instead around how the term is used.  They state, with no little 
annoyance, that Wakefield should get out of his office, and have a look inside the world of 
clinicians and laypeople who use the term in different ways, and which have particular context-
dependent ‘rules of the game’.  They sum up the foundational implications of this use-based 
framework as follows: 
 
The broad concept of disorder is a polythetic, not a monolithic, concept.  As such, 
there need be no essential characteristic, criterion, or single prototype of disorder.  
Instead, multiple prototypes with varying features are used to group together a wide 
range of disparate phenomena by analogy. (Kirkmayer & Young, 1999:446) 
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Adopting a similarly fluid approach to the notion of disorder is the work of Lillenfeld and 
Marino (1995). Their main concern is over the relationship between the term disorder, and what 
it does, or does not, refer to—the question that lies at the heart of this paper. They argue that the 
debate can ultimately be reduced down to the question of whether or not Wakefield’s conception 
of disorder corresponds to an entity in nature, and while they conclude it is possible that such an 
entity exists, and that current models/definitions of disorder represent imperfect reflections of 
this Platonic ideal, to date, all attempts to find a natural boundary between normality and 
abnormality have ended in failure.  Consequently, it is most reasonable to conclude that the 
concept of disorder ‘lacks any clear-cut natural counterpart’ (1995:419).  They go on to propose 
that disorder is best conceived of as a Roschian concept, (named after Rosch (1973), and her 
work on natural categories).  These are mental constructs that are normally employed to 
categorise natural entities which have fuzzy boundaries and lack specific defining features (they 
use the examples of ‘bird’, ‘fruit’ and ‘mountain’).  Such constructs require an animating mental 
prototype that contains all the crucial elements of the category.  Sometimes, examples of these 
constructs correspond to the prototype in clear and unequivocal ways, at other times less well so.  
Significantly, they use schizophrenia as a construct that corresponds unambiguously with the 
prototype, and ADHD as one that does not.  Within this logic then, there is no underlying 
essence that somehow corresponds to the term ADHD.  Instead, Lillenfeld and Marino propose a 
far less neatly defined linguistic model, one that operates through approximations to mental 
constructs.   
 
It is clear, given Kirkmeyer and Young’s focus on the rules of ordinary language use, and 
Lillenfeld and Marino’s emphasis on fuzzy categories, that both sets of writers owes a 
considerable philosophical debt to Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his approach to the philosophy of 
language.  Consequently, it will be useful for this paper to briefly unpack some of Wittgenstein’s 
central arguments in more detail.  
  
Wittgenstein, ADHD, and an alternative philosophy of language 
  
Though starting off as a logician, much in the mould of Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein 
eventually abandoned this position, setting out instead a new approach focusing upon how 
language is actually used, which came to be called Ordinary Language Philosophy (Wittgenstein, 
 1953).  Words were not to be examined in isolation, but should be analysed as components of 
sentences, deployed within given contexts.  In this way, such an approach is based upon an anti-
realist, anti-essentialist philosophical foundation.  Wittgenstein contends that language is a 
collection of activities that operate in the same way as games.  That is, the rules do not have 
inherent meaning, but rather are there to make the game work.  Furthermore, each game has 
different rules, and so the idea is not to uncover some generalised theory of rules, but to draw 
conclusions about which behaviour goes with which language game.  Lycan (2000) makes the 
comparison with a game of chess.  Just as rooks or bishops are defined by the rules that both 
regulate where they start on the board, and how they are allowed to move, so too are linguistic 
expressions, such as ‘Hello’, ‘Excuse me’, and ‘Thanks’.  These are conventional devices 
associated with greeting, apologising and thanking respectively; they are specific sounds with 
functional roles, such that there are appropriate and inappropriate times to use them, combined 
with appropriate and inappropriate responses.  Therefore, in the final analysis, meaning is simply 
the function an expression performs within a given social context.   
 
By the same reasoning, a particular meaning does not reside within the term ADHD that allows it 
to be hooked onto a correlating natural essence, rather its meaning emerges from its use within a 
given sentence.  Following on from McMahon’s (2012) work, a sentence such as ‘the boy has 
ADHD’, when employed by a doctor to a parent in a conversation where both understand the 
rules of the linguistic game, can have a very different set of meanings to the same sentence when 
used by one teacher to another—premised upon the difference between a ‘diagnosis’ and a 
‘label’.  Given the ordinary language imperative to discern meaning within the setting of an 
expression, rather than in isolation, the meaning the term ‘ADHD’ is not to be found by looking 
for some essence of meaning within the word itself.  Instead, Wittgenstein proposes it is to be 
found by understanding the rules of the game regarding its specific deployment, in this case, 
most usually charting the boundary between the normal and the abnormal, the healthy and the 
pathological, and the acceptable and the unacceptable.  This is the point being made by 
Kirkmayer & Young (1999), when they stated that Wakefield’s abstracted definition of disorder 
has little to offer practitioners, teachers and parents who utilise the notion of disorder in a variety 
of ways, often with only limited relation to anything remotely approaching the harm dysfunction 
model.  The rules of the game, for Kirkmayer & Young, are far more about the cultural and 
professional backgrounds, connotative meanings, and organisational and diagnostic structures 
14 
 
usually attached to expressions using the term disorder, than they are about arguments relating to 
either evolutionary biology or syntactic analysis.   
 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of singular, generalised explanations extends to other parts of his 
position on language and meaning, in particular, his work on ‘family resemblances’.  This refers 
to an understanding of language that connects particular uses of the same word, so that rather 
than seeking a single essence that defines the meaning of a word, the meaning is shaped within a 
series of overlapping similarities, with no necessity that any single similarity is common to all.  
He uses the example of various subtypes of games, each contributing to the family resemblance 
for the word game.  Mackinejad & Sharifi (2006, 128) suggest that this metaphor can be 
swapped directly for the notion of disorder:  
 
We can replace the word ‘game’ with the term ‘disorders’ and replace subtypes of 
games (card games, ball games, Olympic Games) with subtypes of mental disorders 
like psychotic disorders, anxiety disorders, mood disorders and pay attention to the 
family resemblances of these disorders.  Each group of mental disorders can have 
some resemblances with other mental disorders, but there is no common feature or 
phenomenon that can embrace them all …  
 
Wittgenstein (1953, 66) also uses the example of the fibres of a tread, in that ‘the strength of the 
thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through it whole length, but in the 
overlapping of many fibres.’  This notion has proved to be highly influential, including providing 
the supporting intellectual framework for the ‘Roschian’ understanding of disorder, as discussed 
earlier within the critique of Wakefield ‘harm dysfunction’ theory.  The fuzzy boundaries and 
lack of specific defining features characteristic of this approach, are all organised within a 
Wittgensteinian logic based upon family resemblances.  That is, the notion of the animating 
mental prototype that contains all the crucial elements of the category, correlates fairly directly 
with the notion of the thread, comprised of various fibres—for fibres, read; ‘uses of the term 
disorder, within the various language games which employ it’—none of which are singularly 
essential to the integrity of the whole.  
 
 On the basis of Wittgenstein’s work, the answer to the question, ‘what is the relationship 
between the term ADHD, and the object it purports to represent?’ is no longer simply one of 
reference.  Indeed, there is probably no longer a single answer at all.  Given words are now only 
to be understood within the context of particular language-games, and their associated meanings 
are assembled, fibre by fibre, into a polythetic thread, a fuzzy cluster of family resemblances, 
lacking an essential core, but still permitting a generalised conception to emerge.  Thus, 
following Wittgenstein, the term ADHD does not have neat hermeneutic boundaries, with a 
corresponding essence in nature, it is rather a term that only gains a meaning when placed in 
context, and which can be applied comfortably to psychological phenomena that share a 
sufficient number of the fibres of the nominal thread, less well so to those that do not.        
 
Conclusion 
 
The publication of the DSM-V has not really altered the theoretical terrain across which ADHD 
is operationalised and understood—the main changes pertaining specifically to the diagnosis of 
the disorder in adulthood.  While the attempt to incorporate Wakefield’s ideas into the working 
definition of a ‘mental disorder’ is certainly a step away from the most objectivist, realist 
interpretation of the notion, it still operates according to referential theories of language which 
assume that the term ADHD stands for a tangible ‘thing’, one that can be identified, isolated, and 
treated.  However, from a strictly philosophical point of view, it is fair to say that Referential 
Theory, and the ideas of the Logical Positivists who sought to improve upon it, has few 
remaining adherents.   
 
Wittgenstein, however, still has considerable currency within debates over language use; his 
Ordinary Language approach has implications for how the notion of a ‘disorder’ might be shaped 
by the contexts in which it is deployed.  It is suggested here that the meaning of terms like 
ADHD can only be assessed and interpreted by factoring into the analysis exactly who is using 
the term, and to whom; how the term is being used, and in what context; and what are the rules 
of the game as applied to that term.  Therefore, the idea that ADHD somehow correlates directly 
with a natural essence becomes increasingly untenable.  A practical consequence of this 
alternative understanding is that the term can now tolerate (in fact, is constituted by) disparate 
modes of use.  The way in which the term is employed by clinicians, and in turn, shapes the 
16 
 
limits of how they organise its conceptual and nosological boundaries, differs from its usage by 
teachers within the classroom, who generally employ a less formal, and more practically-
orientated model—leaving aside the issue of diagnosis/labelling.  It is this very flexibility that, in 
part, accounts for the success of this set of psychological entities, since, within the limits of 
appropriate family resemblances, they can be effectively engaged as required, in the manner in 
which they are required, by whoever requires them.   
 
Two provisos are worthy of mentioning here. First, all medical constructs are ultimately 
vulnerable to anti-realist critiques, not just mental disorders such as ADHD.  By attaching labels 
to bits of nature, we create specific entities that serve a variety of explanatory purposes.  This 
does not render them false, or redundant, it simply alters their ontological status, given we have 
played a role in their formulation.  Second, while this paper articulates different approaches to 
the link between the signifier ‘ADHD’ and its signified, and discusses a wide range of problems 
with the ‘objective’ status of the disorder, this same claim can be made of all disorders—all are 
ultimately constructs.   However, disorders such as ADHD and Dyslexia rise and fall according 
to the supporting evidence they can muster to reinforce their conceptual validity.  By this logic, 
Dyslexia appears to be providing such evidence effectively and comprehensively; to date, 
ADHD does not. 
 
In conclusion, from the various arguments surveyed in this paper, it would appear that if ADHD 
is employed in a purely referential manner to describe an associated natural essence—a disorder 
of the mind—it singularly fails to accomplish this effectively, since it clearly refers to more than 
this, as now articulated in the DSM-V.  In contrast, if ADHD is understood within a plural, 
polythetic linguistic framework, then this approach is likely to be sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate such ambiguity.  However, this in turn challenges the epistemological medical/ 
psychological certainty that supports the knowledge bases that produce such categories in the 
first instance. 
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